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Abstract: 
Justification of a voluntary vaccination policy in England and Wales rests on 
tenuous foundations. Two arguments against voluntary vaccination are 
gaining ground. The first is that globalisation necessitates preparedness 
strategies for pandemics. Assuming sufficient supply, compulsory 
vaccination of adults and children constitutes a potential policy option in 
the context of a severe, vaccine-preventable pandemic outbreak. The 
second argument is that children have a right to preventative medicine and 
thus to vaccination. The influence of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and its emphasis on parents as the trustees of their children’s 
best interests, and the increasingly global nature of our collective and 
individual responsibilities with respect to the transmission of vaccine-
preventable disease present challenges to the right to refuse vaccination 
on our own behalf and on behalf of our children. Exploring methods of 
compulsion and persuasion utilised across Europe, the United States and 
Australia, this article argues that necessity and proportionality must be 
reassessed and national public health law and policy setting out a 
graduated and proportionate approach to compulsory vaccination 
developed as a matter of priority. 
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Voluntary vaccination: The pandemic effect  
Abstract 
Justification of a voluntary vaccination policy in England and Wales rests on tenuous foundations. 
Two arguments against voluntary vaccination are gaining ground. The first is that globalisation 
necessitates preparedness strategies for pandemics. Assuming sufficient supply, compulsory 
vaccination of adults and children constitutes a potential policy option in the context of a severe, 
vaccine-preventable pandemic outbreak. The second argument is that children have a right to 
preventative medicine and thus to vaccination. The influence of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and its emphasis on parents as the trustees of their children’s best interests, and the 
increasingly global nature of our collective and individual responsibilities with respect to the 
transmission of vaccine-preventable disease present challenges to the right to refuse vaccination on 
our own behalf and on behalf of our children. Exploring methods of compulsion and persuasion 
utilised across Europe, the United States and Australia, this article argues that necessity and 
proportionality must be reassessed and national public health law and policy setting out a graduated 
and proportionate approach to compulsory vaccination developed as a matter of priority. 
1. Introduction 
The exercise of choice by competent adults is a cornerstone of medical law. Competent refusal of 
treatment must be honoured, even if irrational and even if it will lead to the patient’s death. 
Vaccination is a form of preventative medicine. It carries burdens and risks and there is no guarantee 
of benefit. It may be that the patient will never come into contact with the virus or that the disease, 
if contracted, would be mild and uncomplicated. And yet, in this article I argue that the endurance of 
voluntary vaccination in England and Wales is susceptible to attack. 
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What sets medical treatment and vaccination apart is the (at least in part) communitarian public 
health goals of the latter. Lawrence O. Gostin, who is much cited in this article, has led a series of 
initiatives to advance the right to health through Public Health Law. Fidler and Gostin describe a 
policy revolution requiring globalised collective action to prepare for bio-threats such as pandemics.
1
 
Vaccination policy forms an integral part of national and global preparedness. Assuming sufficient 
supply, compulsory vaccination constitutes a viable policy option in the context of a severe vaccine-
preventable pandemic outbreak.  
Vaccination is pertinent not only to pandemic emergencies but also to the routine protection of 
public health. As most routine vaccination takes place in childhood, consideration is given to the role 
of parental rights and children’s collective and individual best interests.2 I argue that the current UK 
legal framework fails to set out a clear and proportionate approach. This not only poses a potential 
threat to public health but also raises the possibility of precipitous, disproportionate legal responses 
in the event of vaccine-preventable disease outbreak, that threaten human rights and civil liberties.  
Prior to introducing the public health and security contexts in more detail, it is pertinent to explain 
the special nature of vaccination and consider some of the reasons for vaccine hesitancy. 
Preventative vaccines stimulate production of antibodies to destroy a particular virus by introducing 
to a person free of infection a part of an (active or inactive) virus. In the UK a voluntary routine 
vaccination schedule starts when a baby is 8 weeks old and continues through adulthood. Vaccine 
innovation results in the regular addition of new vaccines. In the UK, the meningococcal group B 
vaccine was added to babies’ route immunisation schedule in 2015 and the Human Papillomavirus 
vaccine was introduced for girls aged 11-14 in 2008. Most vaccines are routinely given in the first 3 
years of life with boosters at adolescence. Adults over 65 are recommended to have an annual flu 
                                                            
* I am most grateful to the reviewers for their helpful comments. 
1
 DP Fidler and LO Gostin Biosecurity in the Global Age: Biological Weapons, Public Health, and the Rule of Law 
(Stanford Law and Politics, 2007), p 145. 
2
 London Borough of Newham v KA (Mother) & Ors [2016] EWFC B11; F v F [2013] EWHC 2683 (Fam); LCC v A, 
B, C and D [2011] EWHC 4033; Re B (Child) [2003] EWCA Civ 1148; Re C (Welfare of the Child: Immunisation) 
[2003] 2 FLR 1095 (discussed below). 
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vaccine and a Shingles vaccine at 70. Catch-up vaccination is possible for those who miss 
vaccinations in childhood. Vaccines for known contagions, such as certain flu strains, are stockpiled 
or subject to Advance Purchase Agreements and rolled out in times of epidemic.3 As epidemics of 
new infectious diseases escalate, global efforts are made to expedite the development of effective 
and safe vaccines. The process is long: vaccines take on average 12 to 15 years to develop.4  
Vaccination has been shown to be cost-effective, accessible and of considerable individual and 
collective benefit. The immunity it confers differs from one vaccine to another and is rarely absolute, 
though improved access to and uptake of polio and measles vaccination could eradicate the 
diseases, as occurred in relation to smallpox. Society also benefits from ‘herd immunity’: those who 
lack immunity (whether because they cannot or will not be vaccinated or because the disease is 
vaccine-resistant) are indirectly protected by the vaccination of a significant proportion of the 
population. The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that vaccination averts between 2 and 
3 million deaths each year,
5
 but globally, 18.7 million infants are still missing basic vaccinations.
6
  
Vaccination is associated with immediate low risk burdens (soon to be reduced somewhat if promises of 
needle-free delivery are made good
7
). Though subject to rigorous clinical trials and post-marketing 
surveillance, very rarely, longer term side effects can flow from anticipated or unanticipated adverse 
reactions. Injury, when it occurs, can be devastating. The H1N1 flu vaccine used in the 2009-10 
pandemic has recently been linked to narcolepsy in children,
8
 and debate continues over possible 
                                                            
3
 NHS England, Pandemic Influenza: NHS Guidance on the Current and Future Preparedness in Support of an 
Outbreak (London: NHS England, 2014), Ref 02616. 
4
 Vaccines Europe ‘How are Vaccines Developed?’ see http://www.vaccineseurope.eu/about-vaccines/key-
facts-on-vaccines/how-are-vaccines-developed/ (accessed 12 June 2016). 
5
 WHO ‘Immunisation’, see http://www.who.int/topics/immunization/en/ (accessed 12 June 2016). 
6
 WHO ‘Isolated gains in immunization need to become the norm’ (11 December 2015), see 
http://www.who.int/immunization/en/ (accessed 12 June 2016). 
7
 See for example L McAllister et al ‘Needle-free jet injection for administration of influenza vaccine: a 
randomised non-inferiority trial’ 23(384) (2014) Lancet 674. 
8
 European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control Narcolepsy in Association with Pandemic Influenza 
Vaccination (a multi-country European epidemiological investigation) (Stockholm: ECDC, 2012). 
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links between vaccinations and ‘Gulf War Syndrome’.
9
 Strict liability claims under the Consumer 
Protection Act 1987 will not succeed unless the vaccine can be shown to be defective. Fault-based 
civil compensation claims are rarely successful unless vaccines are administered regardless of 
contraindications, such as known allergies or immunodeficiency. This is because the risk to the 
individual of contracting the disease is likely to outweigh the risks associated with vaccination.10 
Because vaccination has societal rather than purely personal benefit, most Western countries 
operate some sort of no-fault compensation or statutory payment scheme.11 In the UK, the Vaccine 
Damage Payment Scheme, introduced in the Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979, established a 
statutory payment scheme for those seriously disabled12 by relevant vaccines.13 Today, eligible 
victims are entitled to a one-off tax-free payment of £120,000.14 The 1979 Act is a compromise. 
Eligibility is limited and £120,000 is pitiful compensation when viewed alongside a civil payment for 
comparable injury.15  
At present, Public Health England records relatively high vaccination rates.
16
 Where vaccine uptake 
results in the immunity of a critical proportion of the population, unvaccinated individuals are 
indirectly protected (‘herd immunity’). From a public health perspective at least, it is currently 
                                                            
9
 M Hotopf et al ‘Role of vaccinations as risk factors for ill health in veterans of the Gulf war: cross sectional 
study’ (2000) 320 BMJ 1363; C Bates and J Parkinson, ‘Why hasn't the mystery of Gulf War Syndrome been 
solved?’ BBC News Magazine, (16 January 2016). 
10
 Loveday v Renton, The Times, March 31, 1982. See S Pywell ‘A critical review of the recent and impending 
changes to the law of statutory compensation for vaccine damage’ (2000) 4 Journal of Personal Injury Law 246. 
11
 By 2011, Canada and Russia were the only G8 nations without national no-fault compensation programs: R 
Collier, ‘No-fault compensation program overdue, experts say’ (2011) 183(5) Canadian Medical Association 
Journal E263. And see C Looker and H Kelly, ‘No-fault compensation following adverse events attributed to 
vaccination: a review of international programmes’ (2011) 89 Bulletin of the World Health 371. 
12
 Or injured by vaccination in pregnancy: Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979, s 1(3) and the Vaccine Damage 
Payments Regulations SI 1979/432, regulation 5A. Serious disablement is defined as ‘disablement to the extent 
of 60% or more, assessed as for the purposes of s 103 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 
1922 or s 103 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits (Northern Ireland) Act 1992 (disablement 
gratuity and pension).’ 
13
 The list of relevant vaccines is regularly updated. Most recently rotavirus and influenza (other than influenza 
caused by a pandemic influenza virus) was added by the Vaccine Damage Payments (Specified Disease) Order 
2015, SI 2015/47.  
14
 Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 Statutory Sum Order, SI 2007/1931. 
15
 See M Brazier and E Cave Medicine, Patients and the Law (Manchester: MUP, 2016, forthcoming), 10.15; R 
Tindley ‘A critical analysis of the vaccine damage payments scheme’ (2008) 19(2) European Business Law 
Review 321. 
16
 Public Health England (2015) 9(45) Infection Report (18 December 2015): eg MMR 92.1% for 2 year olds and 
94.9% for 5 year olds, narrowly missing WHO target of 95%. 
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unnecessary to challenge the voluntary vaccination policy,
17
 but the balance is precarious and 
dependent upon the paradigm in which it operates. Two such paradigms are relevant to this article: 
national security and public health. Introducing them in reverse order, vaccination is a preventative 
measure designed to protect the health of the nation. A public health intervention can be both 
scientific and social. If the development, resourcing and provision of a ‘routine’ vaccine is not 
enough to counter the threat to the public health posed by the particular disease, then the voluntary 
nature of vaccination may come within the remit of the public health paradigm. In other words, 
recognition that the exercise of individual liberty is causing collective harm, may justify necessary 
and proportionate restrictions on choice in the interests of the public health.  
There are many reasons why individuals reject routine vaccination, only some of which are briefly 
considered here. Trust of pharmaceutical companies was seriously undermined when research by Dr 
Andrew Wakefield and colleagues alleged links between MMR vaccination and autism. The paper 
was later retracted,
18
 but in the ensuing media storm many children missed out on, or only partially 
completed routine MMR vaccination.19 A significant measles outbreak in Swansea in 2012-1320 led to 
increased efforts to increase routine vaccination.  
There is a vast array of online anti-vaccination propaganda and, in some countries, accurate 
information can be difficult to obtain. In the United States, concern around vaccine safety has 
resulted in a fall in uptake of childhood vaccinations.
21
 This is in part a result of ‘omission bias’, 
where the act of exposing a child to the risk of vaccination is perceived as being higher risk than 
                                                            
17
 See recommendations of Nuffield Council on Bioethics Public Health: Ethical Issues (London: Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics, 2007), para 4.32. 
18
 ‘Retracted — AJ Wakefield et al ‘Ileal-lymphoid-nodular hyperplasia, non-specific colitis, and pervasive 
developmental disorder in children’ (2010) 275 Lancet 445. 
19
 NHS Website ‘MMR catch-up campaign targets a million children’ (25 April 2013), see 
http://www.nhs.uk/news/2013/04April/Pages/New-MMR-catch-up-campaign-one-million-children-
targeted.aspx (accessed 12 June 2016). 
20
 NHS Public Health Wales Measles Outbreak Data (July 2013), at 
http://www.wales.nhs.uk/sitesplus/888/page/66389 (accessed 12 June 2016). 
21
 SP Calandrillo ‘Vanishing vaccinations: why are so many Americans opting out of vaccinating their children?’ 
(2004) 37(2) University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 353. 
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failing to vaccinate, despite scientific evidence to the contrary.
22
 Some people have religious reasons 
for refusing vaccination. Offit explores the use of faith to fight infectious disease. He charts 
outbreaks of vaccine-preventable disease including whooping cough in California, mumps in New 
York, and measles in Ohio’s Amish country.
23
 Where significant numbers refuse vaccination, herd 
immunity is reduced and the voluntary nature of vaccination may become a public health concern. 
Public health is increasingly dominated by perceived threats to global and national security. Since 
the Black Death in the Middle Ages and ‘Spanish flu’ of 1918, infectious disease has been of 
international concern. More recently, as we shall see, globalisation has led to the securitisation of 
pandemics. HIV/AIDS; tuberculosis; escalating coronavirus (infectious respiratory virus) epidemics 
such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003 and Middle East 
Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) outbreak in 2012; influenza viruses (such as H5N1 ‘avian flu’ in 2003 
and H1N1 ‘swine flu’ in 2009); the 2014 Ebola pandemic and the 2016 Zika public health emergency 
put increased emphasis on the need for swift and coordinated global responses to outbreaks of 
infectious disease to avert economic, social and humanitarian crises. The development and 
deployment of vaccination can play a pivotal role in combatting perceived threats to economic and 
social stability and thus to the nation’s security. Vaccination formed a key role in the Department of 
Health’s fight against the 2009 swine flu pandemic. Swine flu is highly contagious but usually mild.24 
Ebola, on the other hand is a severe, highly contagious and often fatal haemorrhagic fever. There 
was no vaccine to tackle Ebola in the 2014 outbreak but in January 2016 a $5m Ebola vaccine deal 
marks the first phase in the production of a global stockpile.
25
 A future Ebola pandemic could elicit a 
very different (national and global) public health response. 
                                                            
22
 See I Ritov and J Baron ‘Reluctance to vaccinate: Omission bias and ambiguity’ (1990) 3 Journal of 
Behavioural Decision Making 263. 
23
 P Offit Bad Faith: When Religious Belief Undermines Modern Medicine (New York: Basic Books, 2015). 
24
 NHS Choices ‘Swine Flu (H1N1)’ see http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/pandemic-flu/Pages/Introduction.aspx 
(accessed 12 June 2016). 
25
 J Gallagher ‘Ebola: $5m vaccine deal announced’ BBC News (20 January 2016). 
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The inevitability of future pandemics constitutes a threat to national security requiring a suitable 
infrastructure with which to tackle future outbreaks. Deployment or development of vaccination has 
an integral strategic role. The infrastructure and its public acceptance affect the political boundaries 
between national security and public health and affect the resilience of rights to refuse vaccination. 
Whilst I do not suggest that adults and children will be forced to undergo routine vaccination, an 
array of strategies exist whereby freedom of choice regarding vaccination might be limited. This 
article seeks to describe and analyse the convergence of developments in children’s rights and the 
securitisation of infection and present an argument for enhanced regulation of public health 
measures. This is important for three primary reasons. First, it outlines the presence of, reasons for 
and likely proliferation of checks on autonomy regarding vaccination. Identifying trends and drawing 
attention to the underlying issues is an important precursor to setting policy priorities and 
developing relevant laws. Second, in the event of vaccine-preventable disease-outbreak, greater 
understanding of the convergence of these factors will aid pragmatist communicative strategies and 
preparedness. Third, understanding the potential legal responses to infectious disease outbreak 
might prevent panic responses that threaten civil liberties. 
The next section explores a range of different measures used to increase vaccination rates in order 
to demonstrate global variation and the different political and cultural tolerances of vaccination 
drivers. It defines the ambits of ‘compulsion’ for the purposes of this article and considers its 
perceived effects and validity. In subsequent sections I consider the case for compulsion (broadly 
defined) in security and public health paradigms, taking into consideration developments in 
children’s rights. 
2. Compulsion  
(a) Increasing vaccine uptake 
In England and Wales persuasion is currently the dominant driver of vaccination. Where advice and 
education is neutral, it serves to enhance autonomous decision-making. More nuanced advice 
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‘nudges’ people toward vaccination.
26
 A wealth of information is provided on NHS websites.
27
 More 
proactive measures favour a communitarian approach and focus on changing behaviour. Free 
scheduled appointments for childhood vaccinations are communicated to parents and GPs are 
incentivised to improve uptake.
28
 School-based vaccination programmes reduce the burden on 
parents and distance vaccination from medical procedure.29 In Australia, additional incentives have 
been utilised. Since 1998, social security payments have been linked to vaccination status and the 
government has boosted payments to doctors to encourage enhanced reminder and record-keeping 
systems.
30
 In 2014, however, 39,000 conscientious objectors and an additional 166,000 children at 
least two months overdue for their vaccinations31 led to calls for more decisive action.32 A ‘No Jab No 
Play’ campaign has since been launched to restrict childcare for unvaccinated children.
33
 
Where the carrot fails, the stick might be used alone or in conjunction with persuasion. Laws 
requiring vaccination, whether backed by penalties or force and regardless of exemption criteria and 
enforcement, are referred to in this article as ‘mandated vaccination’. Across North America and 
Canada parents are required to vaccinate children before they start school, though medical, 
conscientious and religious exemptions are frequently sanctioned. The United States has signed but 
not ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (CRC). Rather than interfere with 
parental control, emphasis is placed on measures that protect others from the implications of 
parental decisions: Parents are generally at liberty to opt out of vaccination, but not necessarily to 
                                                            
26
 See for example G Felsen, N Caetelo, P Reiner ‘Decisional enhancement and autonomy: Public attitudes 
toward overt and covert nudges’ (2013) 8(3) Judgment and Decision Making 202. 
27
 See http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/vaccinations/Pages/childhood-vaccination-schedule.aspx (accessed 12 
June 2016). 
28
 C Price ‘GPs to be paid £1.50 for each child invited under MMR catch-up campaign’ Pulse (1 May 2013).  
29
 AB Middleman, JS Tung JS ‘School-located immunization programs: do parental preferences predict 
behavior?’ (2011) 29(19) Vaccine 3513. 
30
 Media Statement: S Ley MP ‘$26m booster to immunise Australia’ (19 April 2015) see 
https://www.health.gov.au/internet/ministers/publishing.nsf/Content/B13A5C4233686A99CA257E2E0013E61
1/$File/SL044.pdf (accessed 12 June 2016). 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 T Abbott (Prime Minister) and S Morrison (Minister for Social Services) ‘No jab – no play and no pay for child 
care, media release’ (12 April 2015); S Morrison (Minister for Social Services) ‘Government ends religious ‘No 
Jab No Pay’ of benefits exemption, media release’, (19 April 2015). 
33
 News.cam.au ‘Editorial: Time to stop keeping kids immune from jab’ (9 May 2013); and see Victoria’s 
subsequent Public Health and Wellbeing Amendment (No Jab: No Play) Act 2015, introduced 1 January 2016. 
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expose other children to risk, at least in institutions under state control, such as schools and public 
work places. Some children cannot be vaccinated because they are allergic to a component of the 
vaccine or for other health reasons. Their protection can only be assured by the vaccination of those 
around them.
34
 Following a multi-state measles outbreak of more than 100 cases emanating from a 
Disneyland resort,35 California responded with the most stringent vaccination policy in the United 
States, proposing to eliminate personal and religious belief exemptions for vaccines. Senate Bill 277 
is scheduled to take effect in July 2016.36  
In times of emergency, more draconian powers may be utilised. In the United States, the Model 
State Emergency Health Powers Act 200137 was emulated in many states to aid preparation for 
bioterrorism or outbreak of natural disease. It included mandated vaccination programmes backed 
by force. Historically, punishment for failure to vaccinate has also been utilised in England by way of 
fines and (on non-payment) imprisonment. At its height, the 18th century European smallpox 
epidemic had a death toll of nearly half a million people a year.
38
  Wide uptake of vaccines followed 
Sir Edward Jenner’s 1796 discovery that dairy maids who had had cowpox did not go on to develop 
smallpox. However uptake fell dramatically amid safety concerns and doubts as to efficacy.
39
  Private 
measures to enhance uptake such as incorporating vaccination compliance as a term in tenancy 
agreements40 and free provision to the poor, met with limited success. 41 In response, smallpox 
vaccination of infants was mandated in England and Wales in the Vaccination Act 1853, which 
                                                            
34
 Such policies are fiercely opposed. See for example the Canadian case of Clowes v Edmonton School District 
No. 7, 1915 CarswellAlta 56 Alberta Supreme Court, where it was held that regulations issued under the Public 
Health Act, s 68 requiring that no pupil could be admitted to school without proof of vaccination were ultra 
vires due to conflict with the Truancy Act requirement that all children attend school. 
35
 M Majumder et al ‘Substandard vaccination compliance and the 2015 measles outbreak’ (2015) JAMA 
Pediatrics (May 2015). 
36
 SB 277, Pan. Public health, approved June 2015. See 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB277 (accessed 12 June 2016). 
37
 See LO Gostin et al ‘The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: planning for and response to 
bioterrorism and naturally occurring infectious diseases’ (2002) 288(5) JAMA 622. 
38
 N Barquet, P Domingo ‘Smallpox: the triumph over the most terrible of the ministers of death’ (1997) 127(8) 
Annals of Internal Medicine 635. 
39
 See SL Kotar and JE Gessler Smallpox: A History (North Carolina: McFarland and Company Publishers, 2013). 
40
 R v Southwark Guardians' Vaccination Officers [1928] 1 KB 65 involving a petition to search the vaccinations 
register to assess compliance with the terms of the tenancy agreement.  
41
 JE Cooney ‘Legal decisions affecting medical men and the public health’ (1899) Medical Annual 623. 
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required fathers to present their infants for vaccinations and generally to pay for them. Sanctions 
were strengthened in 1861, linking failure to vaccinate and neglect,42 and again in the Vaccination 
Act 1871. Lord Herschell’s 1896 Royal Commission43 recommended a more moderate approach 
which was reflected in the Vaccination Act 1898. The spread of infection was gradually controlled 
and following a global vaccination campaign smallpox was declared eradicated in 1980.  
This snapshot of historical and international measures demonstrates a broad range of options for 
restricting vaccination choice. It also reveals issues around the nature of the restrictions, to which 
we now turn. 
(b) Defining compulsion 
There is a lack of consensus about the precise ambits of the term ‘compulsion’ in the context of 
vaccination policy. Take, for example, Lord Herschell’s Royal Commission recommendations that 
sanctions be imposed on those who failed to present their children for smallpox vaccination without 
lawful excuse, in contravention of the Vaccination Act 1871. The Commission argued that the legal 
mandate did not constitute ‘compulsion’:  
When vaccination is spoken of as ‘compulsory’, it is only meant that, in case a child is not 
vaccinated as prescribed by law, a pecuniary penalty is imposed which may be followed by 
distress and imprisonment. The liability to this penalty no doubt in many cases leads to 
vaccination where it would otherwise be neglected; but, whether the penalty is enforced 
once or repeatedly, it does not compel vaccination in all cases. If a parent is content to pay 
the penalty, his child remains unvaccinated. … Vaccination could be made really compulsory 
                                                            
42
 See for example Allen v Worthy (1869-70) LR 5 QB 163. 
43
 Lord Herschell Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Subject of Vaccination (London: 
HM Stationary, 1889-97). 
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only by taking the child from the parent and vaccinating it against his will, if he would not 
himself procure or consent to its vaccination.’44 
More recently, in the State of Victoria, Australia, legislators have denied the compulsory nature of 
the Public Health and Wellbeing Amendment (No Jab: No Play) Act 2015, which makes enrolment at 
early childhood services conditional upon vaccination status: 
The legislation does not mandate vaccinations, nor does it require the administration of 
vaccines without consent. Parents may continue to make a choice not to vaccinate their 
children. However, Governments have a responsibility to make decisions that balance the 
best possible community health outcomes with individual choices. … [Increasing 
immunisation rates in the community] is a public health priority …
45
 
Lamond distinguishes coercive laws imposing sanction from coercive institutions exercising physical 
force to ensure compliance. Only the latter, he claims, is irresistible.46 Coggon disagrees: ‘An agent is 
given a reason or reasons and is either compelled or not’.
47
 Coggon gives the example of pressure to 
sign a contract. It is no less compulsion because the threat is verbal (such as a promise of damage to 
my car if I refuse to sign) rather than physical. If the threat or force does not produce the desired 
result, it is not compulsion. It is merely attempted compulsion.48 The same is true of modern day 
examples in the United States which allow parents to refrain from vaccination but then impose strict 
limits on the unvaccinated child’s interaction with others in public places such as nursery, school, 
college and employment and even medical practises and paediatric wards49 - ostensibly to protect 
                                                            
44
 Lord Herschell above n 43, para 510. 
45
 Victoria State Government, No Jab, No Play: Frequently Asked Questions (Health and Human Services: 
Victoria, 2015). 
46
 G Lamond ‘The coerciveness of law’ (2000) 20(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 39, p 41. 
47
 J Coggon What Makes Health Public? A Critical Evaluation of Moral, Legal, and Political Claims in Public 
Health (Cambridge: CUP, 2012), p 129. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 DS Diekema ‘Physician dismissal of families who refuse vaccination: an ethical assessment (2015) 43(3) 
Journal of Law Medicine and Ethics 654; SL Block, ‘The pediatrician's dilemma: refusing the refusers of infant 
vaccines’ (2015) 43(3) Journal of Law Medicine and Ethics 648. 
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the safety of others.
50
 The coercive effects on the will of agents can only be measured empirically. 
Coercion, mandate and even certain methods of persuasion can affect the voluntary nature of 
vaccination. From a legal perspective, compulsion is a forcible inducement or act of compelling, but 
enforcement can be variable and selective. From the perspective of the individual, however, 
compulsion is the state of being compelled. Whether or not the law operates to compel is an 
empirical matter. Contrary then to classical political theorists such as Aquinas, Hobbes, Kant and 
Locke who emphasise the method of coercion, the focus for the purpose of this article will be on the 
effect of the action. The labels applied to restrictions on vaccination choice might affect public 
perception, enhancing or reducing acceptability in the public’s eye.  Where they might compel they 
are, for the purposes of this article, considered potential forms of ‘compulsion’ in light of which 
implications for public health, civil liberties and human rights will be considered. 
(c) The efficacy of compulsion 
As Dan-Cohen attests, authority can result in compliance, loyalty and adherence, but so too it can 
‘provoke resentment and defiance’.51 The use of penalties and punishment involve a threat of 
sanction for non-compliance which has potential to be counter-productive. One way in which it 
might fail to achieve its aims, argues Dan-Cohen, is by robbing voluntary commitment to the goals of 
vaccination of its normative force, thus impairing appeal to voluntary obedience. Dan-Cohen 
considers three theories on the relationship between normativity (the appeal to voluntary 
obedience) and coercion.52 A reductive approach found in the works of Austin53 links the normativity 
of law to the law’s coerciveness. This theory was largely displaced by Hart’s
54
 additive theory of law 
backed by sanctions, which distinguishes between the normativity of law and its coerciveness as two 
separate and complementary drivers of compliance. Dan-Cohen’s own, disjunctive theory separates 
                                                            
50
 See US National Vaccine Information Center, State Law & Vaccine Requirements, see 
http://www.nvic.org/vaccine-laws/state-vaccine-requirements.aspx (accessed 12 June 2016). 
51
 M Dan-Cohen, ‘In Defense of Defiance’ (1994) 23 Philosophy and Public Affairs 24. 
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 Ibid, pp 25-26. 
53
 J Austin The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (New York: Noonday Press, 1954). 
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norms and sanctions. The normativity and coerciveness of law can conflict; sanctions can detract 
from the normative force of an imperative. On this basis, coercive threats render the action non-
optional. They do not simply offer another reason for action. The two reasons for action, normative 
and coercive, are mutually exclusive. ‘By using coercive means authority opts for mere compliance, 
while removing the opportunity for voluntary obedience that is a necessary condition for its 
normative appeal.’
55
 According to Dan-Cohen, sanctions designed to ensure compliance, undermine 
the normative appeal of such claims even where the law in question is designed to capture only 
those few for whom the law was written.
56
 In the context of vaccination compulsion, coercive policy 
could exacerbate anti-vaccination sentiment so that those who might under other circumstances 
have consented to vaccinate their children object to doing so in light of the state’s anti-libertarian 
position. It seems clear that the normative and coercive forces can conflict, but are they mutually 
exclusive?  
Coggon questions whether everyone within a legal system is threatened by a generally expressed 
threat.57 Qualification of the threat, for example limiting sanctions to those who do not have a lawful 
justification for failing to seek vaccination, will mean that those who fall within the qualification are 
not incorporated within the threat. Similarly, a threat which addresses a small segment of the 
population will not necessarily operate on the minds of the rest of the population who undertake 
the act for normative reasons.
58
 
The 1896 Herschell Commission reached a similar conclusion. Following the Vaccination Act 1871, 
enforcement was variable and often reluctant. One third of children born in 1897 were not 
vaccinated and ‘one-fourth of the Guardians of the Poor disobey the orders of the Local Government 
Board that they should prosecute for disobedience of the law’.
59
 Consequently it was difficult to 
                                                            
55
 M Dan-Cohen above n 51, p 31. 
56
 Ibid p 49. 
57
 J Coggon above n 47, p 133. 
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59
 JE Cooney above n 41. 
Page 13 of 37 Legal Studies
For Review Only
14 
 
establish efficacy of the vaccine, especially as a modern system of registration of deaths was only 
introduced in 1837. The Vaccination Act 1898 responded to repeated outbreaks and calls for a more 
moderate approach. The severity of the restrictions on personal liberty had become counter-
productive. Mandated vaccination would continue, but without the issues that ‘render it 
burdensome’.60 The 1898 Act reduced penalties for disobedience and removed altogether penalties 
where parents believed that vaccination would be inimical to their child’s health. It attempted to 
find a course which tackled the threat posed by smallpox with the least possible restrictions on 
individual liberty.  
The Commission relied upon the normative appeal of vaccination laws to enhance uptake of the 
smallpox vaccine in the majority of cases.61 Collins and Alanson Picton set out a powerful dissent 
which rested in part on the refutation of the separation between normative and coercive reasons for 
action. Arguing that enforcement of vaccination is ‘neither possible, nor expedient, nor just’,62 the 
dissenters recommended the repeal of the compulsory clauses of the Vaccination Acts
63
 and also the 
avoidance of ‘indirect compulsion’ by way of threatened exclusion from branches of public service.64  
It is clear from Lord Herschell’s report that coercive measures can have a negative effect on 
voluntary uptake of vaccination. I would argue however that it is not the case that compulsion 
necessarily robs a vaccination policy of normative force. Compulsion must be justified as necessary 
and proportionate, in which case it has a legitimate democratic role. Viewed from a relational 
perspective in which the individual is part of a family and society, compulsion need not necessarily 
be viewed as a negative concept. What is necessary and proportionate is dependent not only on the 
                                                            
60
 The new law would not compel ‘those who are honestly opposed to the practice to submit their children to 
vaccination, and, at the same time, leave the law to operate, as at present, to prevent children remaining 
unvaccinated owing to the neglect or indifference of the parent.’ Ibid p 524. 
61
 Lord Herschell above n 43, para 510. 
62
 Dissent of Collins and Alanson Picton Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Subject of 
Vaccination (London: HM Stationary, 1889-97), para 296. And see para 300: ‘We believe the methods of 
isolation of the infected, disinfection, and the observance of strict cleanliness are both more successful and 
more legitimate methods for the State to encourage. They have the advantage of applying the preventive only 
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63
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scientific appreciation of risk in relation to outbreak of disease or falling vaccination rates, but also 
on a range of other contextual, social and political factors including the health infrastructure and 
availability of compensation should vaccination result in injury.  
The next sections explore the role of different forms of (potential) compulsion according to the 
paradigmatic context. As we shall see, the boundaries are blurred and susceptible to political 
influence. The securitisation of infection has implications which extend beyond the outbreak of 
pandemic. 
3. National Security 
A paradigm shift has occurred in national security.65 Bio-threats, such as antimicrobial resistance, 
bio-terrorism and infection, now sit alongside territorial threats as potential causes of mass injury 
and death and of political and economic instability. Many countries now classify infection as a 
potential threat to national security.66 Infection (which can spread by direct or indirect contact; by 
skin, air, blood or droplets) has long been a leading cause of global death. What elevates its 
destabilising potential and renders it a national security issue is the ease with which it now spreads 
in a globalised, interconnected world. In the event of national or regional outbreak, preparedness - 
including vaccination where it is available - is all-important.  
Public participation in planning is integral to success.67 Appraisal of risk, necessity and the 
proportionality of proposed responses is complex and has potential to result in considerable conflict. 
Global responses are hampered by gaps in the availability and quality of health care; differing 
perceptions of risk; inadequate surveillance, compliance and communication; and by insufficient and 
                                                            
65
 GH Brundtland ‘Global health and international security’ (2003) 9 Global Governance 417; EV Bonventre, KH 
Hicks, SM Okuntani US National Security and Global Health: An Analysis of Global Health Engagement by the 
US (Centre for Strategic and international Studies: Department of Defence Washington DC, 2009). 
66
 HM Government National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and 
Prosperous United Kingdom (London: Cm 9161, 2015) paras 3.16-3.17; US National Security Strategy 
(Washington, 2015), p 4. 
67
 See for example ML Flear ‘’Supra-stewardship’: a tool for citizen participation in European Union pandemic 
preparedness planning’ (2011) 62(5) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 677. 
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inconsistent public health laws. My focus is on the latter. This section will demonstrate the necessity 
for coordinated public health law structures, including provision regarding vaccination in an 
emergency, and will go on to assess the relevance of this infrastructure to routine vaccination policy. 
(a) Emergency 
The securitisation paradigm is in fact a series of related issues incorporating security, emergency, 
and preparedness models. It is not always clear when an outbreak becomes an epidemic 
(widespread); an epidemic becomes a pandemic (worldwide spread68); a pandemic becomes an 
emergency; or an emergency threatens security. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde’s ‘Copenhagen 
securitisation model’ identifies different phases of securitisation including the identification and 
acceptance of a threat, emergency reallocation of resources and when the threat is passed, de-
securitisation.
69
 The stages may play out differently in military, economic, environmental, societal 
and political sectors and national responses are dependent on ‘domestic political agendas, economic 
aspirations, social and religious norms as well as international relations between states’.
70
 A 
pandemic threat may constitute an emergency before a single national case is detected. An 
escalating epidemic can lead Governments to declare emergencies at different times depending on 
perceived risk and this can hamper an effective global response. Much reliance is placed on 
international organisations such as the WHO to determine the state of emergency and thus 
stimulate co-ordinated action.
71
 The WHO recently declared international public health emergencies 
in 2014 (Ebola)72 and 2016 (Zika).73 The delayed response to Ebola has been much criticised.74 Gostin 
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 WHO ‘What is a pandemic?’ (24 February 2010), see 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/frequently_asked_questions/pandemic/en/ (accessed 12 June 
2016). 
69
 B Buzan, O Waever, J de Wilde Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 
1998). 
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 C Yuk-Ping, N Thomas ‘How is health a security issue? Politics, responses and issues’ (2010) 25 Health Policy 
and Planning 447, p 447. 
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 For criticism of UK’s over-reliance on WHO, see House of Commons International Development Committee, 
Ebola: Responses to a Public Health Emergency Second Report of Session 2015–16 HC 338 (January 2016), p 22. 
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 WHO Statement ‘Statement on the 1st meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee on the 2014 Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa’ (8 August 2014) see http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-
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and colleagues lament the failure of the WHO to ‘live up to its exalted expectations of the postwar 
health and human rights movement’ and urge it to exercise greater normative authority.75 
Once it is agreed that a state of emergency exists and the threat to national security is real, a 
coordinated response relies (amongst other things) on aligned public health laws. In the United 
States, the Center for Law and Public’s Health Model State Emergency Health Powers Act 200176 
attempted to provide a public health law infrastructure to cope with public health emergencies 
(including, at section 603, an infrastructure for mandated vaccination), but even within North 
America, acceptance of this infrastructure was variable.
77
 The model Act has been criticised for its 
broad scope and potential to breach civil liberties.78 In 2005 a UN resolution79 resulted in the WHO’s 
International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR): 
… to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the 
international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public 
health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade.
80
  
Rendered necessary by the increase in international travel and trade, the Regulations are (from 
2007) a binding instrument of international law signed by 194 countries, including all WHO Member 
States. They cover any ‘illness or medical condition, irrespective of origin or source, that presents or 
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 WHO Statement ‘Statement on the 1st meeting of the IHR 2005 Emergency Committee on Zika virus and 
observed increase in neurological disorders and neonatal malformations’ (8 April 2016) see 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2016/1st-emergency-committee-zika/en/ (accessed 12 
June 2016). 
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the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola’ (2015) 386(10009) Lancet 2204. 
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 LO Gostin, D Sridhar, D Hougendobler ‘The normative authority of the World Health Organisation’ (2015) 
129(7) Public Health 854, p 854. 
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 See LO Gostin et al ‘The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: planning for and response to 
bioterrorism and naturally occurring infectious diseases’ (2002) 288(5) JAMA 622-8. 
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 See The Centre for Law and the Public’s Health ‘The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act’ (15 July 
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Journal of Medicine 1337. 
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could present significant harm to humans’.
81
 The Regulations define a ‘public health emergency of 
international concern’ as:  
… an extraordinary event which is determined, as provided in these Regulations: (i) to 
constitute a public health risk to other States through the international spread of disease 
and (ii) to potentially require a coordinated international response.82  
They set out measures to enhance public health response capacities, international cooperation and 
to control the global transmission of disease. This includes measures to control transmission in a 
pandemic, such as special public health measures for travellers, by which states may require 
examination, treatment and vaccination of travellers as a condition of entry or exit. Whilst Article 
23(4) requires informed consent of the individual or parent, exceptions are set out in Article 32(2), 
‘to the extent necessary to control a risk’. The WHO can issue temporary recommendations – non-
binding recommendations aimed at reducing international spread of disease in public health 
emergencies.
83
 This can include recommendations to ‘require vaccination or other prophylaxis’.
84
  
The first objective of national security in England and Wales is to ‘protect our people’.85 The 
Department of Health is responsible for coordinating a response to incidents that affect health and 
patient care.86 NHS England can take command of all NHS resources in an emergency.87 
Immunisation strategy in England and Wales is guided by the Joint Committee on Vaccination and 
Immunisation (JCVI).
88
 Since the inception of the Health Protection (Vaccination) Regulations 2009,
89
 
the Health Secretary has a duty, as far as practicable, to implement the JCVI’s recommendations. A 
Code of Practice sets out a schematic for evaluating new immunisation programmes which can be 
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 Ibid. 
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expedited in the event of pandemic or emergent epidemic.
90
 A UK Bio-Security Strategy is promised 
in 2016 to strengthen international partnerships and form a new Rapid Response Team91 and the 
Government has established a £20 million UK Vaccines Network.
92
  
Engagement of the security paradigm involves an array of stakeholder, from international bodies 
such as the WHO, to healthcare professionals, patients and recipients of preventative health 
measures. Each has different perceptions of risk associated with pandemic and of the responses 
required. The risk to a nation posed by an escalating epidemic in another country remains difficult to 
predict. Statistical modelling, however sophisticated, is reliant upon accurate data on likely 
transmission and effectiveness of (often developing) treatments and vaccines.93 Consider 
experiences of two global outbreaks of H1N1 influenza. In 1918-20 the ‘Spanish Flu’ outbreak 
resulted in 500 million people being infected and 50 million deaths.
94
 The 2009-10 outbreak on the 
other hand, resulted in 457 UK deaths by March 2010,95 but was ultimately milder than predicted, 
with significant economic consequences:
96
 The UK spent £1.2 billion on 29 million vaccines, antivirals 
and antibiotics of which 20 million doses of vaccine were not used.97  
(b) Civil liberties 
A public health emergency can raise difficult questions about the allocation of resources and 
prioritisation of different groups for treatment and preventative strategies and can necessitate the 
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curtailment of civil liberties in order to protect the public health. In Europe, citizens are protected 
from over-zealous public health-based restrictions on liberty by Article 5(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights: ‘Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall 
be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed 
by law.’ It lays down a positive obligation on the State to protect against unlawful interference98 as 
well as negative obligations to refrain from certain actions. But Article 5 is a limited right. Article 
5(1)(e) makes an exception for ‘the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading 
of infectious diseases …’. This is applicable when those persons are a danger to themselves or to the 
public.99 The implications of Article 5 in the case of mandated vaccination in a security emergency 
have not been tested, but the European Court of Human Rights held that public health-centred 
restrictions on the liberty of a 56 year old man breached Article 5 in Enhorn v Sweden.
100
 When 
Enhorn infected a 19 year old man with HIV, he was required under the (Swedish) Infectious 
Diseases Act 1988 to inform sexual partners and healthcare staff of his HIV status and to use a 
condom. When he persistently refused to comply he was detained for nearly 18 months’ duration. 
The Court held that any deprivation of liberty must be in accordance with national law which must 
itself be proportionate. Article 5(1)(e) will not justify the restriction on the individual’s liberty if 
either the danger ceases to threaten public health or safety, or viable alternatives to detention exist.  
However, given the definitional quandaries around terms such as ‘pandemic’, ‘emergency’, and 
‘threat to national security’, and the very real problems in predicting the course and severity of 
outbreaks of infectious disease, there is a legitimate concern that the WHO’s infrastructure or 
national preparedness strategies might be utilised inappropriately to restrict individual liberties by, 
for example, mandating vaccination against certain diseases. The emergency paradigm might justify 
a blurring of the separation of powers between Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. The powers of 
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the Legislature and the Judiciary (through judicial review), can be curtailed or eliminated to allow 
short-term crisis-management by the Executive. In the context of counter-terrorism law and policy, 
de Londras and Davis demonstrate a ‘‘security bias’ resulting in the unnecessary introduction of 
repressive laws and policies that tend to impact significantly on individual right protections’.
101
 They 
emphasise the importance of cross-institutional involvement to check the powers of the Executive. 
In the context of infectious disease there is also a risk that long term battles against infectious 
disease can be rebranded as national security threats in the event that vaccination rates fall. In the 
context of the economic crisis, Greene has emphasised the potential misuse of the label ‘emergency’ 
to justify Executive controls in long-term crises.102  
Public health law preparedness plans do not always make clear the nature and extent of Executive 
powers. For example, the Czech Republic vaccination policy operates on the basis of decree rather 
than law in order to facilitate flexibility in the event of an emergency such as a pandemic.103 The 
WHO’s IHR 2005 form a broad and (necessarily) vague infrastructure. In the crux of a public health 
emergency: 
… social perceptions of infectious diseases can lead to unethical infringement of civil liberties 
and stigmatization of the ill, those that treat them and those who otherwise come to be 
associated with them.104 
The Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues Ethics and Ebola reports that, in 2014, 
a college in Texas stopped admitting students from countries affected by Ebola, and healthcare 
workers who had treated Ebola-victims were socially excluded and subjected to violence; a travel 
and immigration ban on HIV positive foreign nationals was only lifted in 2010; and Asians across the 
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world faced discrimination during the SARS epidemic which started in 2002.
105
 There is potential for 
discrimination to extend to vaccination policy where infection is vaccine-preventable. Historically 
there is evidence that mandated vaccination policies can lead by analogy to further restrictions on 
civil liberties. Consider the much maligned US Supreme Court decision of Buck v Bell which 
sanctioned sterilisation of a mildly disabled woman, Carrie Buck:  
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, 
or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit 
from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad 
enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. ... Three generations of imbeciles are enough.106 
Future pandemics are inevitable but the potential for emergency responses to exceed the 
boundaries of proportionality is clear. The answer lies in preparedness which should incorporate 
public health law structures to facilitate a graduated response including, where it is deemed 
necessary, use of persuasion and compulsion. Since pandemics were recognised as a national 
security risk in the early 1990s, international communication and global and national preparedness 
have come far, but there is clearly more to do both in formulating a fuller national public health law 
preparedness strategy and in ensuring its proper control.107 The World Economic Forum’s Global 
Risks Report 2015 refers to the: 
… potentially devastating impact of the rapid and massive spread of infectious diseases, 
which reflects the need for a higher level of preparedness for major pandemics at both the 
country and international levels to address this important risk.
108
 
The UN recently warned: 
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As the [Ebola] outbreak demonstrated, effective future responses will require country and 
global preparedness to avoid the reversal of gains in many aspects of development.109 
Global disparity is problematic. Fidler and Gostin assert that a policy revolution has taken place;110 
national preparedness for pandemics (and other bio-threats) in a globalised age necessitates 
interaction of a vast array of community, legal and public health structures. Gostin argues that the 
response to global health hazards extends beyond the scope of health care and beyond the control 
of separate nations. Globalised collective action is required.111 The UK Government has 
acknowledged that: ‘No single nation can act alone on such transnational threats.’
112
 Surveillance, 
infrastructure and vaccination might prevent local outbreak, but multilateral public health 
cooperation is increasingly influential on national vaccination policies and disaster preparedness.  
This section has made clear that compulsory vaccination is a potential response to national and 
international health emergencies, particularly when they are perceived to threaten national security. 
An Ebola vaccine is currently under development. Ebola is highly virulent and has a fatality rate of 
around 50%. Risk of outbreak in the UK could potentially lead to degrees of compulsion if voluntary 
vaccination proved insufficient to protect the public health.  
The potential for global inconsistencies in vaccination policies to hamper a unified pandemic 
response mean that the very risk of future epidemics and pandemics necessitates flexibility in the 
boundaries between security and public health paradigms. It is to the latter that I now turn to show 
that the formulation of a clearer public health law structure to facilitate graduated compulsion is 
necessary not only in the context of securitisation of infection but also to tackle national and local 
outbreaks that are deemed to warrant public health intervention.  
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4. Public health 
Public health law governs the powers and duties of the state to constrain the interests of individuals 
in order to promote the best possible health of the nation. Dan-Cohen argues that:  
Authority usually comes clothed in coercion. Although it is of the essence of authority to 
appeal to our voluntary obedience, it is also characteristic of all important authorities, most 
prominently the state, to use coercive means to back up this appeal and to secure 
compliance.
113
 
The legal response to the threat to the public health of vaccine-preventable infection encompasses 
laws, policies and conventions. Its legitimacy is not focused solely on positivist laws, but on the 
political legitimacy of autonomy constraints as a response to the perceived threat posed by the 
infection or disease. As such, ‘public health’ can operate as a political device,114 framing an issue as a 
pragmatic problem that counters certain objections based on human rights and civil liberties. In 
relation to compulsory vaccination, the public health response outside the national security 
paradigm is reliant on limited public health powers and the criminal law. This section questions the 
adequacy of the current public health law framework in England a d Wales. If we accept, as I argue 
we must, that individuals have a moral responsibility to prevent harm to others by the voluntary 
infliction of disease, then there is an argument that the criminal law might be extended to impose 
penalties on those who cause vaccine-preventable harm to others. I would suggest that such an 
approach would be heavy-handed. The strengthening of public health measures would be a less 
restrictive, more appropriate and more effective means of tackling the risks to the public health 
posed by the collective vaccination response in a public health crisis that falls short of a national 
security threat. 
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(a) Criminal or public health law? 
Article 25 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights requires states to provide a standard of 
living adequate for health and well-being. The right extends beyond the provision of health care to 
also cover preventative medicine and control of diseases. In common with many states, England and 
Wales have relevant statutory powers to protect public health, including powers of compulsion. A 
suite of Health Protection Regulations followed the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984.115 
The ‘all-hazards approach’ of the legislation covers both infection and contamination. The 
Regulations include a list of notifiable diseases116 and of local authority powers which include, for 
example, provisions to keep infected children away from school.117 Where a threat to human health 
could present significant harm, a local authority can apply for a Part 2A Order under the 1984 Act.
118
 
A Part 2A Order can require a person to undergo medical examination, be kept in isolation, be 
decontaminated and subject to restrictions. It cannot require a person to undergo treatment or 
vaccination.  
There is, however, potentially an alternative means of penalising those who cause others harm 
through the rejection of vaccination and subsequent contraction and spread of disease. Brazier and 
Harris argued in 1999 that the criminal enforcement of obligations not to cause harm by voluntarily 
transmitting disease is potentially justifiable in principle: 
Is there any reason to treat disease differently from violence? A slap affronts dignity. A blow 
may bruise or even break a bone. The hurt will mend. Communicable diseases, to a greater 
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or lesser extent, can kill and inflict irreversible damage to health. … The interests of others 
are prejudicially affected by disease to a greater extent than is the case with much of the 
overt violence which is the everyday business of the criminal law. Nor should the threat to 
society as a whole posed by disease be lightly discounted. The highly contagious diseases 
threaten numbers that even the most notorious serial killer could not dream of.119 
Whilst knowingly exposing others to infectious disease may not be intentional or deliberate, its 
voluntary nature connotes responsibility which might in turn justify a legal response to protect the 
rights and health of others. Though the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 was originally 
intended to deal with crimes of violence, it was recognised in the 2004 case of R v Dica that infection 
can constitute harm and thus constitute an offence under sections 18 and 20 of the Act.120 To date, 
criminalisation has been restricted to reckless (foreseen) transmission of serious sexually 
transmitted disease such as HIV. However in R v Marangwanda121 the infection of two girls with 
gonorrhoea by casual (non-sexual) touching constituted grievous bodily harm. As sexual contact is 
not a requirement for prosecution, it is difficult to see why the offence should be limited to diseases 
that can be transmitted sexually. Though GBH is limited to the transmission of disease where the 
effect is ‘serious enough’122 the offence has been applied in relation to herpes,123 and might equally 
apply to other potentially serious vaccine-preventable diseases such as certain strains of flu, 
regardless of the actual ramifications of disease transmission.  
There have been several attempts to reform the Offences Against the Person Act including a draft 
Bill in 1998.
124
 Chapter 6 of a 2015 Law Commission’s report
125
 deals with the criminalisation of 
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123
 R v Golding [2014] EWCA Crim 889. 
124
 Home Office Violence - Reforming the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (Consultation Paper, 1998). 
125
 Law Commission above n 122. 
Page 26 of 37Legal Studies
For Review Only
27 
 
disease transmission. The Commission recommended leaving the law on reckless transmission of 
disease within the general offence of causing injury or harm. Alternatives such as creating a specific 
offence of recklessly transmitting disease or particular diseases; or limiting criminalisation to 
intentional transmission were rejected, at least for the present. The Law Commission recommended 
a specific review of these issues in due course.  
Extension of criminal laws to cover the exposure of others to the danger of infection has been 
countenanced in other countries.126 It is a controversial use of the criminal law127 that has potential 
to lead to discrimination of at-risk groups. Nonetheless, acceptance of moral responsibility for our 
voluntary acts, rather than just those things we desire, might ostensibly justify the imposition of 
some degree of legal responsibility. Brazier and Harris argue: 
If the … law is to play an effective role in the control of disease, the law should seek to 
punish an offender's fundamental irresponsibility rather than focus exclusively on the 
outcome of such irresponsibility. Society's interest is in deterring the infected and infectious 
from creating unjustifiable risks to others.128 
Glover-Thomas and Holm argue that a vaccination programme is a public good that is reliant on both 
availability and uptake. They argue that as long as some people choose vaccination in order to 
reduce community risk (rather than purely for personal benefit) this creates a reciprocal duty 
amongst others. This duty involves small risk and burdens, but the financial and health benefits to 
the state are considerable: ‘For those who choose to participate in the system and accept its 
benefits, it is contended that there is an obligation to participate in recommended vaccinations.’
129
 A 
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related argument is set out in the NHS Constitution, which lists vaccination as a public 
responsibility,130 and more general governmental focus on the ‘social contract’ between the public 
and the NHS, urging people to take responsibility for their own health.
131
 
In this section, I have argued that there is moral responsibility to prevent harm to others by the 
voluntary infliction of disease and that legal mechanisms exist by which choice restriction might be 
brought about.
 132
 Legal mandate could take a variety of forms and I have suggested that it might in 
theory include criminal law measures. Calling for an approach that balances threats to liberty and 
health, Brazier and Harris warned in 1996 that: ‘If the will is present, the means can be found to 
punish those who spread disease.’133 Should vaccination levels fall or pandemic threaten our shores, 
there is a clear potential for greater restrictions on choice. In a measles outbreak in 2013 a YouGov 
poll revealed that the majority supported ‘making it legally compulsory for parents to have their 
children vaccinated with the MMR injection’.134 55% of Britons were in favour, rising to 62% in the 
Midlands and Wales where the outbreak was most severe. Articulation of legal and policy public 
health mechanisms would facilitate a proportionate response in the event of both vaccine-
preventable global pandemics and more localised outbreaks of infection. This would reduce the risk 
of over-reaction such as might occur if criminal law measures are utilised to punish disease 
transmission. 
5. Protecting children’s best interests 
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So far the article has focused on arguments that levels of compulsory vaccination are justified to 
protect public health across both security and public health paradigms. Given that both routine 
vaccination and pandemic vaccination policies often prioritise childhood vaccination, this section 
considers the impact of arguments based on parental autonomy rights and children’s welfare rights.  
The right to the highest attainable standard of health set out in Article 25 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights is not emulated in the European Convention on Human Rights. For 
children, the effect of this omission is accentuated by the Convention’s negative obligation in Article 
8 to protect the freedom of parents to make certain decisions about their children. The doctor 
patient relationship is governed by a legal commitment to autonomy and informed decision 
making.135 Children’s rights, however, cannot be grounded in autonomy because not all children are 
capable of autonomous decision making. As we shall see, prioritisation of the best interests of the 
child in the Convention on the Rights of the Child might be utilised to limit parental rights to refuse 
to vaccinate children if it can be shown to be necessary to protect their best interests. 
(a) Parental rights 
The Children Act 1989 introduced the concept of parental responsibility which it defined as ‘all the 
rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation 
to the child and his property’.136 Parents have powers to make decisions about children in their care, 
including the right to consent to and refuse medical treatment and preventative care on the child’s 
behalf. There are a number of limitations on these powers. First, doctors are able to challenge 
parental decisions where they are perceived to conflict with the child’s best interests. Where the 
matter cannot be resolved, a court will make a best interests determination.137 Second, the parental 
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duty to act in the child’s best interests is controlled to the extent that omissions constitute criminal 
neglect138 manslaughter139 or necessitate the child to be taken into care.140 But in the face of familial 
unity, the courts currently have little latitude to interfere with a parent’s decision to refuse 
vaccination. Consider the words of Baker J in the recent case of six-year-old Ashya King, whose 
parents removed him from hospital and the UK to find alternative treatment: 
It is a fundamental principle of family law in this jurisdiction that responsibility for making 
decisions about a child rest with his parents. In most cases, the parents are the best people 
to make decisions about a child and the State - whether it be the court, or any public 
authority – has no business interfering with the exercise of parental responsibility unless the 
child is suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm as a result of the care given to the child 
not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give.
141
 
As long as a policy of voluntary vaccination endures, the power of the courts to impose vaccination 
on individual children is largely limited to parental disputes, which have consistently been resolved 
in favour of vaccination. This is because once a case comes before the court parental wishes are 
relevant only insofar as they ‘may illuminate the quality and value to the child of the child/parent 
relationship’.142 The courts have been unimpressed by arguments that vaccination is non-essential 
and invasive, and have extoled the benefits to children of preventative medicine.143 In Re C (Welfare 
of the Child: Immunisation),
144
 the court made the orders sought by two fathers who wanted their 
daughters (aged 4 and 10) to receive a range of routine vaccinations contrary to the wishes of their 
mothers who considered the vaccines unsafe. In LCC v A, B, C and D,
145
 parental responsibility of four 
children (aged 5, 6, 9 and 13) was shared by the local authority who sought vaccination of the 
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children, and the natural parents who objected on the basis that they suspected that their first 
child’s autism was a result of the MMR. Theis J held that vaccination was in the four children’s best 
interests. Finally, in F (Mother) v F (Father)146 Theis J held that vaccination would be in the best 
interests of an 11 and 15 year old. Along with the mother, the two ‘charming, intelligent, articulate 
and thoughtful’147 young people objected to vaccination. 15 year old L, who objected principally on 
the basis of her veganism (given that gelatine is an ingredient of the vaccine) had been given the first 
of two MMR vaccines as a baby and therefore benefited from heightened immunity.148 These 
decisions were not based on the public interest: the primary consideration was the welfare of the 
children. However, much store was put in the Department of Health recommendation that 
vaccination is in children’s medical interests and this recommendation is based on the value of 
vaccination to children both individually and collectively.  
(b) A case for limiting parental rights? 
Judicial acceptance that vaccination is generally in the best interests of children might form the basis 
of a challenge to parental authority if it could be established that there was no breach of Article 8 
because protective measures were proportionate to the aim of protecting the child.
149
 Article 8(1) is 
qualified by 8(2) where intervention is proportionate and necessary to protect ‘… health or morals, 
or to protect the rights and freedoms of others’.  
The Convention on the Rights of the Child was ratified by the UK in 1990. It has not been 
incorporated into law, though legislation in Wales requires Ministers to have due regard to the 
Convention.
150
 Its judicial application facilitates a more comprehensive protection of children’s rights 
than would be achievable under the European Convention on Human Rights. The CRC acknowledges 
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the rights, responsibilities and duties of parents, but Article 5 requires that they are exercised so as 
to provide ‘appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognised in 
the Convention’ (my italics).  
Turning to children’s rights,
151
 Articles 6 of the CRC protects the right to life, survival and 
development and Article 24 the right to the highest attainable standard of health, including 
measures: ‘to diminish infant and child mortality’ and ‘to develop preventive health care’.
152
 Article 3 
provides that ‘the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration’. The CRC rejects a 
traditional approach based on the natural sociobiological authority of parents over children and 
adopts a liberal social-constructive position in which parental authority is grounded in the child’s 
right to participation, equality and (present and future) liberty.153  
In England and Wales the response in the Children Act 1989 to Article 3 was to make the welfare of 
the child the paramount consideration in court proceedings concerning the upbringing of a child.154 
Furthermore, recent debate about the direct enforceability of the Convention, and Article 3 in 
particular, strengthens arguments that parental rights must be exercised in the child’s best interests 
even beyond the scope of the Children Act.
155
  
Engelhardt outlines four different understandings of the family from which flow different views of 
the authority of parents in medical disputes. He points out that the view taken in the CRC – that 
parents are guardians of children’s rights - is not universally supported. The result, he contends, is 
that the best interests approach might be formally supported whilst in practice parental autonomy is 
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allowed to flourish.
156
 I would submit that evidence of harm to children would justify a more 
restrictive approach. That evidence may not currently exist, but it is not fanciful to suggest that in 
future it might and almost certainly will.  
In times of pandemic the mental, physical and physiological attributes of children can subject them 
to particularly high levels of risk and family-centred care becomes very important. Voluntary 
vaccination of children during a recent pandemic reveals surprising contrasts. The vaccine against 
H1N1 influenza in 2009 was offered to ‘at risk’ groups including pregnant women, those with chronic 
disease and children under 5. But in England and Wales, only 23.6% to 26.1% of under 5 year olds 
were vaccinated.157 Contrast this with the Netherlands, with 80% coverage and Norway with 60%.158 
The pandemic was milder than had been expected, and low uptake might also be explained by virtue 
of concerns about vaccine safety. H1N1 vaccine uptake tells a cautionary tale about the 
predictability of pandemics. It tells an equally important lesson about reliance on parental consent. 
Parents can also decide to take unvaccinated children abroad and expose them to risk of disease. 
Yellow Fever is the only disease specifically designated in the WHO’s IHR 2005159 as requiring proof 
of vaccination or prophylaxis (subject to exemption) as a condition of entry to certain countries. 
Depending on destination, the NHS recommends vaccination for hepatitis A, typhoid and cholera, 
but parents are free to ignore the advice on their children’s behalf. Even in relation to routine 
vaccination, 8% of parents of children aged 2 had not taken them for the MMR vaccination in 2014-
15. Uptake of the nasal flu vaccine was 38.5% for 2 year olds compared with 72.7% for those over 
65, though the risks associated with complication are similar.
160
 
A number of countries allow routine vaccination without parental consent, relying on a mixture of 
public health and welfare-based considerations. According to the Child Rights International Network 
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(CRIN) courts in Croatia and Slovakia have rejected claims that vaccination of children without 
parental consent breaches parents’ constitutional rights.161 In Croatia, which has mandated 
vaccination since 1999, opposition on grounds that vaccination poses an unacceptable threat to 
child health, was rejected in 2014.
162
 In 2015, the Czech Republic upheld the constitutionality of a 
decree imposing fines for parents who fail to secure vaccination for their children on the basis that 
the public health is elevated above individual rights.
163
 A similar argument was recently raised to 
defend a mandated vaccination policy in Turkey. There the vaccination programme, which requires 
that infants receive 16 different vaccination doses in their first two years, was extended and 
enforced following the influx of Syrian refugees which ostensibly exacerbated risk of infection. The 
Supreme Court of Appeals 2nd Civil Chamber, upholding the policy, held that one year old twins could 
be vaccinated without the consent of its parents in the interests of the public health and to protect 
the child’s best interests pursuant to the CRC.164 Five months later, however, the decision was 
overruled by the Constitutional Court which held that vaccination without consent is 
unconstitutional,165 offending Article 17 of the Turkish Constitution which protects the ‘corporal 
integrity of the individual’. Amendments to vaccination laws will follow.  
In England and Wales, emphasis on parental rights will endure as long as vaccine uptake is sufficient 
to protect children’s collective interests. Best interests is not limited to medical interests and strong 
judicial commitment to protecting parental rights is in part a response to the relational and 
interconnected nature or parental and children’s rights. In the current climate the harm that would 
befall a child taken from its parents and vaccinated against their will would far outweigh the medical 
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benefits to the child that flow from vaccination. High uptake of routine vaccination boosts herd 
immunity and protects children who lack immunity. Were this situation to change, a graduated 
approach to restricting the choices of parents might be deemed both necessary and proportionate. 
6. Conclusion 
Vaccination aims to protect individuals and those with whom they may come into contact, but also 
to eradicate disease or increase herd immunity. The aims are thus individual and collective. This 
article has demonstrated an increasingly strong case for restrictions on choices. The clearest case for 
compulsion is in a national security emergency. Vaccines can provide a vital tool in the effort to 
combat infectious disease, particularly when used in conjunction with treatment and isolation 
techniques. In 2014 the outbreak of Ebola was most severe in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Over 
11,000 people died.
166
 Potential vaccines were urgently pursued and their development 
prioritised.167 Assuming plentiful supply,168 would England and Wales’s voluntary vaccination policy 
survive in the context of a further outbreak? The WHO’s IHRs 2005 provide a broad public health law 
structure under which vaccination might be required. Such measures would not offend Articles 5 or 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights provided they were necessary to avert or mitigate a 
public health disaster and the method of compulsion (which I have argued exists on a spectrum) was 
the least restrictive means of achieving the aim. I have identified factors that make necessity and 
proportionality difficult to judge and therefore open to flexible interpretation. These relate to the 
unpredictability of pandemics and their effects and the resulting definitional quandaries around 
terms such as ‘emergency’, ‘threat to national security’ and even ‘pandemic’. The threshold for 
action can differ from country to country; and from one outbreak to another. This leaves the 
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application of the WHO’s broad infrastructure susceptible to misuse with potential adverse 
implications for civil liberties. 
Conversely, there may be times when an outbreak or threat of disease does not fall within the 
securitisation paradigm but nonetheless threatens the public’s health. The UK Government refers 
increasingly to patient’s personal responsibilities for their own health as part of a social contract 
with the NHS.
169
 The NHS Constitution refers expressly to patient responsibility to take part in 
vaccination programmes.170 Moral responsibilities to undergo vaccination are dynamic, relational 
and multi-faceted, as is clear, for example, from the pressure placed on healthcare workers to 
accept vaccination in times of pandemic.171 Even when vaccination rates are high, the moral 
obligation to vaccinate ourselves and our children might justify measures in the interests of the 
public health that make it harder to opt out of vaccination. Where the risks to the public health are 
heightened I have shown that the criminal law could potentially be utilised to deter and punish 
those whose rejection of vaccination leads to transmission or even risk of transmission of 
preventable disease. I have argued that this would constitute an inappropriate use of the criminal 
law, likely to exacerbate discrimination. The juridification of public health measures at an 
international level paves the way for adoption of more supportive, multi-dimensional, graduated 
national interventions that are tailored to the severity of the risk. 
Security and public health arguments in favour of restrictions on vaccination choice apply 
irrespective of whether the vaccine is aimed at adults or children. Where parents make decision on 
behalf of children, additional child welfare and parental autonomy considerations are bought to 
bear. In a number of countries, the combined effects of public health and child welfare arguments 
have led to restrictions on parental choice. The courts in England and Wales have rejected the 
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categorisation of vaccination as invasive and unnecessary and instead characterised it as 
preventative medicine in the best interests of the child. Parental disputes have all been resolved in 
favour of vaccination, even when the young people themselves have objected. Emphasis on parental 
choice is currently commensurate with children’s best interests but the balance could be upset by 
evidence of harm to children’s health interests. Paul Offit, the Chief of Infectious diseases at the 
Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, argues that parents who decide against vaccination make a 
choice for their own children and for those with whom they come into contact, including those too 
young or ill or allergic to receive vaccination. ‘What is paramount?’ asks Offit, ‘the freedom to make 
bad health decisions or the right of the community to protect itself from those decisions’?172  
This article has demonstrated the fragility of the UK’s voluntary vaccination policy in light of the 
cumulative impact of globalisation, public health and child welfare considerations. In the context of 
the flexible paradigms of national security and public health, the patient’s right to refuse medical 
intervention is subject to challenge. As we have seen in other countries, a fall in uptake or rise in 
infection rates can quickly elevate an outbreak to epidemic or emergency status and be used to 
justify compulsion as necessary and proportionate. The potential to compromise human rights and 
civil liberties can be mitigated through the development and enactment of national public health 
laws and policy to provide a proportionate and graduated approach to compulsory vaccination in its 
various forms. In England and Wales this is a matter of priority.  
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